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Japan’s  diplomacy  must  always  be  rooted  in
democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  and  respect  for
human  rights.  These  universal  values  have
guided Japan’s post-war development. I firmly
believe  that,  in  2013  and  beyond,  the  Asia-
Pacific region’s future prosperity should rest on
them as well. (Abe Shinzo, Prime Minister of
Japan,  proclaiming  Japan  “Asia’s  Democratic
Security Diamond”, 27 December 2012) 1
The  vision  is  beautiful.  Japan  indeed  has
something  to  be  proud  of .  Though  its
democratic  constitution  was  partly  composed
by  postwar  allied  occupiers,  it  has  been
embraced  by  the  Japanese  people  and  has
stood the test of time.
Japan’s  democracy  is  not  perfect.  (Which
country has a perfect democracy?) The political
system has been lopsided,  and has generally
failed  to  generate  vigorous  two-party
competit ion;  some  topics  of  debate  –
particularly relating to the Emperor – have long
been the subject of media self-censorship. All
the same, freedom of thought has thrived for
more  than  half  a  century,  and  Japan  has
developed an impressive array of small  scale
grassroots social movements, willing to take up
challenging reformist and human rights causes.
2
But now, ironically, the loud proclamations of
“democracy,  the  rule  of  law and respect  for
human rights” are being accompanied by the
rise of practices that suggest the opposite. A
combination of soft repression and hard hate
speech is  creating a troubling reality  in Abe
Shinzo’s Japan.
Prelude: Abe, NHK and the Comfort Women
It was an ominous harbinger of things to come:
a  sad  tale  of  political  interference,  self-
censorship, denials, coverups, revelations and
resignations.
In  2000,  groups  from  that  vibrant  Japanese
world  of  grassroots  human  rights  action
organized  the  Tokyo  Women’s  War  Crimes
Tribunal.  Their  aim was  to  address  wartime
acts of violence against women by the Japanese
military, which had not been prosecuted by the
official  tribunals  immediately  after  Japan’s
defeat. In particular, the Tribunal focused on
the fate of very large numbers of Asian women
who were forced or tricked into working in a
network of “military comfort stations” all over
the wartime Japanese empire, where they were
subject to extreme sexual abuse.
The  2000  Tribunal  was  an  NGO  event,  but
followed the procedures of formal war crimes
trials.  It  was  conducted  before  judges  from
Europe, North and South America, and Africa
with  extensive  experience  in  international
human  rights  issues.  Sixty-four  surviving
former “comfort  women” gave evidence,  and
the  event  concluded  with  a  judgment
condemning the role of the Japanese state, the
late  Emperor  Hirohito  and  wartime  military
leaders. 3
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Former  Comfort  Women  testify  at  2000
Tokyo Tribunal
The Japanese national broadcaster, NHK, made
a documentary about the Tribunal, which was
shown in January 2001. But shortly before the
program  went  to  air,  something  unexpected
happened.  Members  of  NHK’s  senior
management  suddenly  demanded  drastic
changes to the completed program, removing
(amongst  other  things)  testimony  given  by
former Japanese soldiers and all mention of the
Tribunal’s  preliminary  findings.  (The  final
judgment  was  yet  to  be  handed  down.)
Four years later, in the midst of a protracted
lawsuit  over  the  mangled  documentary,  the
program’s chief producer revealed that these
cuts had followed intervention from two senior
government politicians, one of whom was Abe
Shinzo,  then  Deputy  Cabinet  Secretary,  now
Japan’s Prime Minister.
Abe  denied  pressuring  NHK  to  alter  the
program,  but  admitted  that  he  had  indeed
contacted NHK senior management before the
documentary  went  to  air  to  express  his
“concerns”  about  what  he  saw  as  its  likely
“bias”. The program was broadcast at a time
when  there  was  increasing  debate  in  Japan
about the fate of Japanese nationals who were
believed to have been abducted by North Korea
(and  whose  abductions  were  soon  to  be
confirmed  by  Kim  Jong-il  himself).  AsAbe
explained,  he  “suspected  that  the  NHK  documentary
might be part of an underground plan to quell
public  reaction to the abductee problem and portray
North Korea as victim”. 4
The  broadcast  also  took  place  just  as  the
government was determining its next tranche
of funding to NHK, and, unsurprisingly, NHK
management  took  the  Deputy  Cabinet
Secretary’s concerns very seriously indeed.
Old Politics in the New Media
Three motifs  form a  constant  refrain  in  Abe
Shinzo’s  political  career.  The  first  is  his
hawkish  stance  towards  North  Korea,  and
particularly  his  response to  the abduction of
Japanese citizens. This is the issue that helped
bring him to political centre stage.
The second is his close association with those
who  wish  to  rewrite  Japan’s  textbooks  to
remove references to  the darker  episodes of
the wartime past – and who react particularly
sharply to any mention of the “comfort women”
issue. Abe and his associates do not deny the
existence of the “comfort station” system – the
evidence  is  too  overwhelming for  that  –  but
they do seek to deny that women were forcibly
recruited to the system by the Japanese army.
Lobbying  by  right  wing  groups  has  in  fact
already resulted in elimination of all references
to the “comfort women” disappearing in junior
high school textbooks, but a further bête noire
of  the  right  survives:  the  cautiously-worded
apology on the subject made by Japan’s Chief
Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei in 1993. Steps
towards retracting the Kono Statement  were
taken under Abe’s first Prime Ministership in
2006-2007,  but  domestic  and  international
outcry  persuaded  Abe  to  back  down.  Now,
following Abe’s re-election, the issue is back on
the agenda.
These two themes are linked to a third, longer
term  aim  of  revising  Japan’s  postwar
constitution to remove the “peace clause” and
open the way to more rapid military expansion.
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A substantial win in July’s upper house election
would give Abe’s  government the majority  it
needs for this purpose. In the lead up to this
election,  Abe  has  been  treading  cautiously,
focusing on references to the need to reform
procedural  clauses  in  the  constitution,  but
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  his
ultimate  aim of  a  substantial  revision of  the
constitution is still alive.
While  the  core  of  Abe’s  political  program
remains constant, the nature of the media has
undergone far reaching changes since the 2001
NHK incident. The greatest change, of course,
has been the massive growth of the Internet,
accompanied by a proliferation of chat and blog
sites where anonymous users post social and
political comments ranging from the anodyne
to the eccentric to abusive diatribes. This is a
worldwide  phenomenon,  but  has  been
particularly  visible  in  East  Asia:  booming
mobile  phone  use  has  been  accompanied  by
waves  of  Internet  nationalism,  in  which  the
young in China, South Korea and Japan often
trade insults with one another.
In Japan, the online bulletin board “2-Channel”,
with  many  millions  of  regular  users,  has
become particularly well known as a forum for
virulent attacks on those seen as “unpatriotic”
or  “anti-Japanese”.  Some  of  its  discussion
“threads” carry violently xenophobic or racist
messages,  recycling  wartime  language  and
imagery that had long disappeared from public
discourse  in  Japan.  A  Social  Media  White
Paper,  published  by  private  marketing
companies in 2012, shows that 2-Channel users
are  predominantly  young  and  male,  though
teenage girls are also significant participants in
the site’s discussions. 5
It is impossible to tell who contributes to the
racist  threads  published  on  2-Channel,  as
opposed  to  the  site’s  many  other  innocuous
conversations  on  topics  such  a  travel,
celebrities  and holiday jobs.  But  the popular
image of the 2-Channel racist blogger is of a
lonely,  frustrated  otaku  an  isolated  person  with  obsessive
interests,  probably unemployed or in a dead-end
job, seeking some sense of identity by sharing
anger and bitterness with nameless others. 2-
Channel has recently been overtaken by global
social media such as Twitter, but the anger of
the “otakusphere” continues to replicate itself
in ever changing forums.
2-Channel
Offline,  the  rise  of  2-Channel  has  been
paralleled by the emergence of new forms of
far right movement in Japan. One of the best
known of these is the “Citizens’ League to Deny
Foreigners Special Rights” (Zainichi Tokken o
Yurusanai  Shimin  no  Kai,  or  Zaitokukai  for
short),  established  in  2007.  Unlike  older  far
right  groups,  whose  loudspeaker  vans  with
their military flags and martial music have long
been  a  familiar  sight  on  Tokyo  streets,
Zaitokukai recruits the young, and makes very
active use of social media to spread its message
via  video  blogs  of  its  demonstrations.
Zaitokukai  protest  actions  are  most  often
directed  at  Korean  residents  in  Japan,
particularly those seen as being associated with
North  Korea,  but  the  group’s  list  of  other
targets  is  long  and  eclectic,  including
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indigenous  Ainu  organizations,  China,  the
Democra t i c  Par ty  o f  J apan  and  the
documentary  movie  Cove.Zaitokukai
demonstrations are noisy and notable for the
offensiveness  of  their  slogans,  but  have
generally attracted a rather small  number of
demonstrators. 6
Japan is a country with low levels of violence,
and  the  ugly  rhetoric  of  2-Channel  and  the
Zaitokukai might be seen as having little more
than nuisance value, at least by those who are
not on the receiving end of the abuse. But the
verbal  violence  of  the  frustrated  and
marginalized can be deeply intimidating, and is
particularly  alarming  when  it  becomes
enmeshed with the centers of political power:
with the organs of national government and of
its law enforcement agencies. That curious but
calculated  intermeshing  of  the  marginalized
and the powers-that-be is increasingly evident
in Japan today.
Facebook Friends to the Rescue: Mobilizing the
Otakusphere
After a rather slow start, a number of Japanese
politicians  have  taken  to  social  media  with
great  enthusiasm.  Among  them  is  the
nationalistic mayor of Osaka, Hashimoto Toru,
who issues an unending series of tweets on his
policies  and  general  view of  the  world,  and
caused particular controversy last year with a
series  of  rambling  tweets  on  the  “comfort
women” issue, in which he denounced the 1993
Kono apology and expressed support for Abe
Shinzo’s  position  on  the  “comfort  women”.  7
Abe  himself  has  also  responded  most
enthusiastically  to  the  political  opportunities
created by the Internet age. He was quick to
create a personal website, and has maintained
a Facebook page since well before his recent
election.  He  or  his  personal  secretary  post
comments on the page almost every day, and it
boasts over 4,800 Facebook friends and more
than 230,000 followers.
On  22  December  2012,  six  days  after  the
election  which  returned  Abe  to  the  prime
ministership,  NHK devoted its  evening prime
time to a discussion program about the election
results  and  the  implications  of  the  new
government for Japan. The participants in the
program were the Secretary-General of Abe’s
ruling party,  Ishiba Shigeru, the head of the
government’s  coalition  partner,  Yamaguchi
Natsuo,  three  university  professors  and  an
economist from the influential think tank the
Japan Research Institute. NHK invited viewers
to send in questions that  they would like to
have raised during the discussion.
About two hours before the program went to
air, Abe’s secretary posted a message on the
prime minister’s Facebook page mobilizing its
friends and followers to action. The secretary
slammed  the  “bias”  of  NHK  and  warned
readers that the forthcoming program would be
a “clean sweep of Abe bashing”. The web link,
email address and fax number of the program
were included in the post,  and Abe’s friends
and  followers  were  urged  to  bombard  the
program  with  messages.  The  secretary’s
message  also  made  derogatory  comments
about  the  discussion  program’s  panelists,
describing  one  (University  of  Tokyo  political
scientist Fujiwara Kiichi) as being “famous for
saying that ‘the five abductees who came home
to Japan should be sent straight back to North
Korea”‘. 8
 
Very  far  from being  a  “clean  sweep  of  Abe
bashing”, the program proved to be very much
like  most  other  political  discussions  on  the
public broadcaster.  The early questions were
directed  to  the  two  government-party
politicians,  who  were  allowed  a  substantial
share  of  the  air  t ime,  and  much  of  the
discussion centred around positive suggestions
on the need (for example) to listen to the voices
of the young and to address the problems of
Japan’s  aging  population.  Questions  were
raised, among other things, about the content
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of  the  government’s  proposed  large-scale
public work’s programs, but the criticism was
so calm and reasoned that it would require an
unusually thin skin to be offended by it.
Later the same evening, after the program had
gone to air, the Prime Minister added his own
comment to his secretary’s post, describing the
program’s participants (other, presumably than
Ishiba  and  Yamaguchi)  as  “too  low-level”
(osomatsu sugi). One panelist was described as
being “beyond the pale”, and of two others, the
Prime  Minister  wrote  that  they  should  be
“ashamed to show their faces in public”. 9
Shortly afterwards, Professor Fujiwara posted a
mildly  worded  response  on  Twitter,  pointing
out  that  he  has  never  said  or  written  that
Japanese  abductees  should  be  returned  to
North Korea. Energetic efforts by at least one
pro-Abe website to prove him wrong ended in
failure  1 0,  but  meanwhile  his  supposed
“statement” on the abduction issue (which in
the Japanese context is roughly the equivalent
of  an  American  politics  professor  expressing
support  for  Al  Qaida)  was  circulating  like
wi ldf i re  through  Japan’s  r ight  wing
blogosphere.
Neither Abe nor his secretary has apologized
for  or  revised  the  comment  about  Fujiwara,
which  still  remains  on  the  Prime  Minister’s
Facebook page. No opposition politician and no
national newspaper or TV station in Japan has
questioned  the  Prime  Minister’s  use  of
Facebook  to  l ibel  an  academic  public
commentator. Nor did any of them discuss the
propriety  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  Facebook
page  being  used  to  post  a  misleading
description of a TV discussion program, with
the intention of inciting readers to inundate the
program with pro-government comments.
The Abe Facebook message can be read as a
calculated  warning  to  any  Japanese  media
outlet  or  commentator  proposing  to  express
doubts at government policy that they are likely
face  officially  sanctioned  harassment  and
vilification.  In  the  Internet  age,  direct
intervention by politicians in the media is no
longer  needed;  they  can  get  their  Facebook
friends to do it for them.
The Wrong Side of the Law: Policing Freedom
of Speech in Abe’s Japan
Since its establishment in 2007, the Zaitokukai
has weathered ups and downs in its fortunes,
but rising tensions between Japan and its Asian
neighbours  and  the  election  of  the  new
government appears to have given the group a
new  lease  on  life.  It  has  also  spawned  a
growing proliferation of similar groups which
use  the  same  tactics,  and  often  work  in
coordination with one another: among them the
bizarrely  named  Shinshakai  Undo(literally,
New  Social  Movement).  The  focus  of  these
groups’  recent  actions  has  been  the  Tokyo
district  of  Shin-Okubo,  which  has  a  large
concentration  of  ethnic  Korean  and  Chinese
inhabitants. On 9 February 2013, some 150 to
200  far  right  demonstratorsstaged  a  march
through the busy main streets of Shin-Okubo,
yelling vitriolic abuse and incitements to ethnic
violence  at  inhabitants  and  passers-by,  and
carrying  Japanese  military  flags  and  an
assortment of placards with extremely violent
slogans, of which “Kill Koreans” was one of the
less obscene. The demonstration was organized
by  Shinshakai  Undowith  the  support  of  the
Zaitokukai,  and  featured  marshals  with
armbands  and  face  masks,  who  prowled  the
pavements, mingling with the very substantial
police  presence,  and  occasionally  pushing,
shoving or physically intimidating people who
appeared to  express disagreement with their
views.
Japan acceded to the International Convention
on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial
Discrimination on 15 December 1995. Article 4
of the convention states that signatories agree
to  “adopt  immediate  and  positive  measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts
of, such discrimination” by declaring it a crime
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to  disseminate  “ideas  based  on  racial
superiority  or  hatred,  incitement  to  racial
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or
incitement  to  such  acts  against  any  race  or
group of persons of another colour or ethnic
origin”. 11
Since  signing  the  convention,  the  Japanese
government  has  repeatedly  lodged  a
reservation to Article 4. Japan, it says, does not
intend  to  pass  specific  laws  banning  hate
speech or incitement to discrimination, partly
because  such  laws  could  limit  freedom  of
speech. But equally importantly, according to
the  government,  hate  speech  laws  are
unnecessary  in  Japan  because  acts  of  race
hatred  are  already  crimes  under  normal
Japanese  criminal  law.  Reassuringly,  Japan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out, if ideas
disseminated by any group damage “the honor
or credit of a specific individual or group, such
dissemination of ideas is punishable as a crime
of defamation (Article 230, Penal Code), insult
(Article 231), or damage to credit, obstruction
of business (Article 233) of the Penal Code. If
such  activities  include  threatening  contents
against  a  specific  individual,  they  are
punishable as a crime of intimidation (Article
222),  collective  intimidation  and  habitual
intimidation (Article 1 and Article 1-3 of  the
Law  concerning  Punishment  of  Physical
Violence  and  Others).  Incitement  to  racial
discrimination  is  punishable  as  a  crime  of
instigation  (Article  61,  Penal  Code)  or
assistance (Article 62) of the crimes if an act
constitutes  one  of  the  above-mentioned
crimes”.  12
The Ministry goes on to cite a list of other laws
prohibiting  (amongst  other  things)  “cases  in
which a large number of persons assemble and
use violence or threat (Article 106)”, “collective
violence/intimidation/destruction  of  utensils
(Article 1)”, and incitement to any of these acts
(Article 61). 13
J a p a n ’ s  m o s t  r e c e n t  r e p o r t  o n  i t s
implementation of the Convention, delivered in
January 2013, re-emphasizes these arguments
against  hate  speech  laws,  adding  that  “the
Government of Japan does not believe that, in
present-day  Japan,  racist  thoughts  are
disseminated  and  racial  discrimination  is
incited, to the extent that the withdrawal of its
reservations  or  legislation  to  impose
punishment  against  dissemination  of  racist
thoughts and other acts should be considered
even at  the risk of  unduly stifling legitimate
speech”. 14
Interestingly,  the  large  contingent  of  police,
w h o  s t o o d  b y  a s  t h e  r a c i s t
demonstratorsmarched  through  Shin-Okubo,
seemed  much  more  anxious  to  control  the
behavior of the local residents and passers by
on the sidewalk than to enforce Articles 1, 61,
62,  106,  222,  230,  231 or  233 of  the  Penal
Code.  Video  of  the  event  provides  abundant
evidence of defamation, insult,  obstruction of
business,  threats,  collective  intimidation  and
incitement to racial discrimination. Not one of
the demonstrators was arrested.
The Japanese police are not always so relaxed
in  their  attitude  to  demonstrations.  For
example,  in  October  2012  a  peaceful
demonstration  against  the  incineration  of
nuclear-contaminated waste from the disaster
of 11 March 2011 took place in Osaka. Almost
two months later, three people who had taken
part in the demonstration were arrested and
imprisoned on the grounds that their protest
route  had  taken  a  short-cut  through  Osaka
Station concourse, thus violating the “Railway
O p e r a t i o n s  A c t ” ,  w h i c h  p r o h i b i t s
demonstrations on railway stations. Two of the
demonstrators were released after a couple of
weeks  in  gaol,  but  one,  Mr.  H.,  remains
incarcerated,  more than two months on.  Mr.
H’s  crime  was  considered  particularly  grave
because, police allege, he remonstrated with a
railway official who asked him to stop handing
out  leaflets,  and  in  the  process  trod  on  the
official’s toe. 15
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This  incident  may  seem unconnected  to  the
racism of the Zaitokukaiand its allies, and so it
was, until 13 February 2013, when Mr. H. and
three others were accused of a new crime. This
time, their supposedly criminal acts stem from
a gathering held in September 2012 to discuss
the issue of the “comfort women”. In response
to mayor Hashimoto’s Twitter comments on the
“comfort women” issue, Osaka citizens invited
an  86-year-old  Korean  former  “comfort
woman”, Kim Bok-Dong, to speak to a public
meeting about  her  experiences.  The meeting
took  place  without  incident,  despite  (in  the
words of a friend of mine who attended) the
presence of “quite a few ‘nasty’ looking men…
standing near  the main door  of  the building
making  dreadful  stares  at  people  who
attempted to enter”. A small number of police
were also in  attendance outside the meeting
hall.
It was not until more than four months after the
gathering (and almost two months after Japan’s
general  election)  that  a  member  of  the
Zaitokukai  filed  a  complaint  with  the  police,
claiming  that  he  had  been  “assaulted”  by
supporters of the “comfort women” (including
Mr.  H.)  who  had  denied  him  access  to  the
September  2012 meeting.  Despite  the  delay,
police took up the case the alacrity, descending
on the houses and offices of “comfort women”
supporters  to  search  their  premises  for
incriminating evidence, and even conducting a
search of a cafe where the support group holds
informal meetings. 16
In  this  case,  the  authorities  appear  utterly
unconcerned about any “risk of unduly stifling
legitimate speech”.
Japan’s  diplomacy  (and  Japan’s  domestic
policy), to cite Prime Minister Abe, must always
be rooted in democracy, the rule of law, and
respect for human rights. Many in Japan have
worked for these aims for a very long time. But
there  is  no  rule  of  law if  the  instigators  of
violence  are  left  to  peddle  hatred  with
impunity,  while  those  who  pursue  historical
justice and responsibility are subject to police
harassment.  There  is  no  respect  for  human
rights where those in power use cyber bullying
in an attempt to silence their opponents. And
democracy is left impoverished when freedom
of hate speech is protected more zealously than
freedom of reasoned political debate.
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